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ATTORNEY'S FEES IN DIVORCE*
JAMES M. CARSON"
It is perfectly clear that a lawyer's primary duty is to his client, but
that duty must be exercised in strict accordance with the code of ethics, with
the duty of the lawyer to his profession, to the courts, to the state and to him-
self. The fixing of attorney's fees is a very difficult and delicate matter.
In case of an agreement as to the terms of divorce with regard to incidental
matters, the question of agreement upon attorney's fees is bound to arise. If
both lawyers, that is, if the lawyers for both sides, approach the whole matter
of adjustment in a spirit of fairness, agreement upon such fees should be fairly
easy to achieve. If agreement is not possible, then the attorneys should not
permit their own selfish interest in fees to prevent them frot making a de-
sirable agreement in the interest of their clients. Everything else may be
agreed to except fees and they may. by stipulation or otherwise, be left to
the court or courts handling the matter to fix.
Fundamental considerations to be taken into account in fixing attorney's
fees, whether by the attorneys themselves through agreement or by the courts,
by stipulation or hy the local authority that have to fix fees for the representa-
tion of the wife, are fairly clear, although involving many complications.
Under the Code of Ethics the Supreme Court of Florida has adopted as
a Rule of Court the Code of Ethics. There are three stbdivisions of the Code
of Ethics:-Rule A consists of 36 sections of "Ethics Governing Judges";
and Rule B consists of 46 sections of "Ethics Governing Attorneys"; and Rule
C consists of 10 sections of ethics governing "Circuit Court Commissions, who
are charged primarily as agents of the court with questions arising under the
Code of Ethics." I Sections 12 and 13 of Rule B read as follows:
12. "Fixing the Amount of the Fees.-In fixing fees, lawyers should
avoid charges, which overestimate their advice and services, as well as those
which undervalue them. A client's ability to pay cannot justify a charge in
excess of the value of the service, though his poverty may require a less
charge, or even none at all. The reasonable requests of brother lawyers,
and of their widows and orphans without ample means, should receive
special and kindly consideration.
"In determining the amount of the fee, it is proper to consider (1) the
time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty' of the questions involved
* This article is adapted from Mr. Carson's new book, FLORIDA LAW OF Til FAMILY,
MARRAGE AND DIVORCE, to be published by The Harrison Company, Atlanta, Ga., in
the near future.
** Mr. Carson, a member of the Florida Bar, is the author of the widely known book.
FLORIDA COMMON LAW PLEADING,; he has also written for various legal periodicals, and
formerly taught in the School of Law, University of Miami.
1. Code of Ethics as adopted by the Sup. Ct. of Fla. (1941).
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and the skill requisite properly to conduct the cause; (2) whether the ac-
ceptance of employment in the particular case will preclude the lawyer's
appearance for others in cases likely to arise out of the transaction, and in
which there is a reasonable expectation that otherwise he would be employed
or will involve the loss of other employment while employed in the particular
case or antagonisms, with other clients; (3) the customary charges of the
Bar for similar services: (4) the amount involved in the controversy and
the benefits resulting to the client from his services; (5) the contingency or
the certainty of the compensation; and (6) the character of the employment,
whether casual or for an established and constant client. No one of these
considerations in itself is controlling. They are mere guides in ascertaining
the real value of the service.
"'In determining the customary charge of the Bar for similar services.
it is proper for a lawyer to consider a schedule of minimum fees adopted by
a Bar Association, but no lawyer should permit himself to be controlledt
thereby or to follow it as his sole guide in determining the amount of his fee.
"In fixing fees it should never be forgotten that the profession is a
branch of the administration of justice and not a mere money-getting trade.
13. "Contingent F-ees.-A contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned
by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, including
the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject
to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness."
It will be noticed that a schedule of minimum fees, adopted by the Bar
Association in any particular jurisdiction, may be considered in this connection.
In other cases the Supreme Court of Florida has laid down some
general Rules as to fees in decisions in cases other than divorce or separation
cases. We have quoted a footnote by Mr. Chief Justice Fred Davis in the
Scott v. Kirtley case.2
The opinion in the case frankly changes the common law rule as to the
collection of attorney's fees out of property realized for the client through his
services and his skill. In that case, from the body of the opinion, we quote.
as follows:
"We are of the opinion that where, as the result of services rendered
by an attorney at law in suing for and recovering for his client certain real
estate, the client has realized the real estate as fruits of the attorney's pro-
fessional services, under an express or implied understanding on the part
of both attorney and client, that a reasonable attorney's fee would be charged.
and would of necessity be payable out of the property realized by the client
as a result of the successful efforts of the attorney in litigating for it, that
even in the absence of any express contract for a definite amount of fee, an
equitable lien, based upon the fundamental maxim or equity that no one
shall be unjustly enriched at another's expense, may be implied and declared
by a court of chancery, out of general considerations of right and justice which
must be applied to the relations of the attorney and client with reference to
the fruits of the transaction, and the circumstance of their dealings with each
other, with the understanding that the services of the attorney would be pay-
able out of what the client should realize as a result of the successful efforts
of the attorney."
2. Scott v. Kirtley, 113 Fla. 637, 152 So. 721 (1933).
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A further quotation from the footnote is as follows:
"Faced with the task of trying to apply the ancient conceptions of the
practice of law to modern conditions wherein the employment of clerks and
stenographers, the procurement of occupational licenses and payment of taxes
for the privilege of becoming an attorney for hire, the burden of office rent,
purchase of legal supplies and the necessity of constantly spending money
to keep current a working law library, suggest to the mind of the writer of this
note that the implications of our statutes recognizing lawyers as public servants
for hire as well as officers of the court, should be given some consideration by
the present day courts in declaring what, if any, is to be considered as the
common law in the light of known conditions of the present clay."
\Ve shall consider the common law case of Ruruch z. Giblen. " From
that case we make a rather full quotation:
"The matter of fixing attorney's fees often involves the most delicate
technique of the lawyer's art. The primary, though not the exclusive, elements
that enter into the determination of such a fee are the amount and value of
the services rendered, the responsibility undertaken, the importance and re-
sults of the litigation, and the time required in the conduct of it. In estimating
the value of an attorney's services his skill, experience, professional reputa-
tion, and the amount of his business may be taken into consideration. The
prices usually charged for similar services in the same court and community
may also be shown.
"There is but little analogy between the elements that control the determi-
nation of a lawyer's fee and those which determine the compensation of skilled
craftsmen in other fields. Lawyers are officers of the court. The court is an
instrument of society for the administration of justice. Justice should be
administered economically, efficiently, and expeditiously. The attorney's fee
is, therefore, a very important factor in the administration of justice, and if
it is not determined with proper relation to that fact it results in a species of
social malpractice that undermines the confidence of the public in the bench
and bar. It does more than that. It brings the court into disrepute and destroys
its power to perforn adequately the function of its creation.
"'A client's financial rating may have much to do with fixing the anount
of his lawyer's fee when done by express contract and at arm's length, but
when the lawyer comes into court relying on a quantum meruit that must be
tested by the value of the services rendered. In other words, the fee fixed
must bear a just relation to the prevailing philosophy with reference to the
value of the lawyer's services and must bear some relation to the results
secured. No one has an inherent right to practice law. He does so by grace
or franchise of the State and he accepts that franchise fraught with a public
trust. In the experience of every practitioner conditions will arise that may
preclude him from charging an adequate fee or in fact any fee whatever.
but such cases make no difference in his loyalty and the zeal he exhibits in
behalf of his client.
"In cases where, as in this case, the attorney relied on an implied contract
or a quantum meruit for compensation he is entitled only to the reasonable
value of his services. It consequently becomes necessary to determine such
reasonable value by resort to the record to ascertain the amount of labor
performed and to the evidence of those competent to testify to determine the
3. Baruch v. Giblen, 122 Fla. 59, 164 So. 831 (1935).
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value of said labor or services, the skill expended, and such other elements
as may enter into his compensation. An attorney interested in the outcome
is competent to give evidence as to the value of his services, his legal knowl-
edge, and his professional experience.
"The testimony of duly qualified witnesses given as expert opinion
evidence is admissible and may be offered in support of the issue as to the
value of the services of aqi attorney though such issues may be proven by
other evidence and other circumstances affecting it. The rule is generally
approved that while expert testimony is strongly persuasive as to the value
of an attorney's services it is not conclusive, neither is it binding on the court
or the jury. Such evidence should be weighed with reference to the nature
of the services, the time consumed in their perfornance, and other incidents
peculiar to the case in which it was performed."
In decisions in some divorce cases what has been said by the court with
reference to fees in divorce cases, also applies to fees in suits for alimony
unconnected with divorce, and to annulment cases where the wife defeats
the husband's suit for divorce.
There has been much controversy in recent years with regard to decisions
of the Supreme Court of Florida reducing the amount of attorney's fees
awarded to attorney for the wife by the lower courts. Some of the criticisms
of the Supreme Court may be justified, but in many such decisions an exami-
nation of the record will show that the fault, if any, was that of the attorney
who failed to make proper presentation and proof in the lower court as to the
work done, the risks taken, the results accomplished and the value of the
services based upon expert testimony.'
We have already seen that in the Ball case, the court did not disturb the
award of $25,000.00 as attorney's fees for the wife because the record itself
made clear the amount of work done, and the expert testimony of attorneys
practicing in the very county where the case was decided, justified the award.
The Supreme Court sits in Tallahassee and is made up of lawyers (several
of whom have served for years as Circuit judges) from various parts of the
state. The quotation from the Code of Ethics given above indicates that fee
schedules adopted by Bar Associations may be considered. It is probably not
necessary to say that in the larger cities, where costs of practicing law and
of living are higher, the minimum fees provided by such schedules are much
higher than in smaller cities and towns where the overhead of law offices and
4. The question of the amount of attorney's fees has been discussed in many cases.
Since no two of the cases are alike and since decisions as to the amount of fees properly
awarded, even ten years ago, should not be controlling today, under the authority of the
Margaret Ann Super Market vs. Scholl case, 159 Fla. 748, 34 So.2d 238 (1948), it is not
thought necessary to discuss amounts, except to cite the cases in which the court itself
discussed such amounts. Clark, 155 Fla. 574, 20 So.2d 900 (1945) ; Arendall, 61 Fla. 496,54 So. 957 (1911) ; Haddon, 36 Fla. 413, 18 So. 779 (1895) ; Tenny, 147 Fla. 672, 3 So.2d
375 (1941) ; Baldwin, 154 Fla. 624, 18 So.2d 681 (1944); Diem, 136 Fla. 824, 187 So. 569(1939) ; Buchanan, 154 Fla. 396, 18 So.Zd 7 (1944) ; Cole, 146 Fla. 196, 200 So. 544 (1941).
Particular attention is called to the Clark case in which the court indicated that there
should have been expert testimony as to a proper amount to be awarded for temporary
counsel fees.
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the cost of living are both less than in the larger cities. The expert testimony.
therefore, as pointed out in the Giblen Case 5 should e that of attorneys who
practice in the same community and in the same court where the fees are
awarded. The Supreme Court should not be blamed for reducing fees in cases
where lawyers themselves do not lay the proper foundation.
Under the Rules of the Supreme Court for appeals, we are expected to
shorten the record when a case is appealed, but if the question of attorney's
fees is involved, the amount of work actually done, whether in court or in
negotiating for an agreement, or in investigating should somehow appear in
the record. In the Stein Case, as will be seen, affidavits showing the amount
of preliminary work done, the risks taken and the results accomplished were
filed in Court. Expert testimony, based upon the court file and upon hypo-
thetical questions assuming the facts set out in the affidavits to be true, was
taken. Since that case, including all preliminary investigations and negotia-
tions had been pending in Dade County, the testimony of lawyers practicing
in Miami formed the basis for the awards.
Since, as we have several times pointed out, most divorce cases now
proceed upon the basis of an agreement, reached sometimes after long negoti-
ations between the attorneys for the respective parties, it may be safe for
the courts to assume that each of the attorneys knows more about the difficulty
and extent of the negotiations than will appear in the actual record, and
therefore courts, while not absolutely bound by such agreements, should be
very cautious about upsetting them. The presumption is, of course, that each
attorney obtained for his own client the best results possible and that neces-
sarily includes the amount of attorney's fees agreed upon.
Since this matter of attorney's fees has been so much in controversy, a
common law case involving attorney's fees, which was submitted to Judge
George E. Holt, Senior Circuit Judge of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, without
the intervention of a jury, has been decided. His opinion was dated July 12,
1949. The plaintiff was the attorney who had represented a wife charged with
adultery by her husband. The attorney for the wife fought, for a period of
some sixteen months, the question of the jurisdiction of the court with the
result that he won the case for the wife and procured the dismissal of the
divorce suit. Thereafter he stied the husband at common law. At first blush,
it would seem that the question of fees was a matter which should have been
settled in the divorce case. Even though it was finally held that the court was
without jurisdiction the husband, who had invoked its jurisdiction, would
have been estopped to question upon that ground an order awarding fees to
the attorney for the wife. Whether the court had jurisdiction for any other
purpose or not, it certainly had jurisdiction to hear and decide upon evidence
5. Baruch v. Giblen, 122 Fla. 59, 164 So. 831 (1935).
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and testimony as to the residence of the husband. Under the authority of the
Sherrer Case 6 it had jurisdiction for that purpose at least. The attorney repre-
senting the wife, however, properly proceeded for her and in her interest,
without complicating the matter by attempting to procure an award of at-
torney's fees before the dismissal of .the case. Judge Holt himself, in his
opinion, points out that not having been awarded attorney's fees as against
the husband in the Chancery Court, the weight of authority is to the effect
that the husband is not liable in a common law action for attorney's fees for
the wife, although several states have decided to the contrary. Since the
precise question has never been decided by the Supreme Court of Florida,
Judge Holt's opinion cannot be taken to be settled law in Florida, unless his
judgment on appeal is affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State. But, for
the time being at least, his ruling on the question of law prevails in this Cir-
cuit. It seems that on principle he is right, but I shall not undertake to predict
what the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida will be.
However, the opinion and verdict are apparently sound and seem to
me to be so well reasoned and so important that we have incorporated excerpts
from that opinion at the end of this article.
Because I have practiced divorce law myself, and because a great many
of my opinions as to attorney's fees in divorce cases are based upon my own
personal experience, and because I thought we should have an objectively
reasoned discussion of the.factors involved by an able lawyer, who specializes
in other matters, I have asked Mr. Robert B. Cole of Miami, a member of
the firm of Evans, Mershon, Sawyers, Johnston and Simmons, to point out
some matters which in his opinion, in the light of the decisions, should be
taken into account in divorce cases, as distinguished from other types of cases.
Mr. Cole's specialties with his firm are corporate, financial and tax matters,
and therefore I believe his opinion as to the financial considerations involved
should be more valuable than mine, and certainly more objective. The follow-
ing quotations are from his memorandum, but the footnotes are my own.
"There are books, law review articles and opinions of the Courts which
cover fully the elements controlling the amount of atorney's fees in legal
matters of all types. A *review of these sources indicates, however, that the
problems unique to divorce cases are not pointed out to the extent that they
should be. Also, many of those sources do not take into account the current
purchasing power of the dollar or the variations in the expense of practicing
law among various communities.
"Most divorce cases, even those which appear to be contested, are in fact
agreed upon by the parties. The agreement normally extends to the fixing
of attorney's fees. The record in those divorce cases which are in fact vigor-
ously contested often is no greater than in those cases where in fact the
divorce, property settlement and attorney's fees have been agreed upon. The
6. Sherrer v. Sherrer 334 U. S. 343 (1948).
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record does not tell the story. The real contest where there is one is usually
behind the scenes and pertains to the property settlement. The attorney's file,
and facts which do not appear in any file, rather than the Court file show
the extent of the contest.
"Judges are prone to feel that since they at one time (often years ago)
practiced law, they are in a position to determine the proper amount of an
attorney's fee. They do not take the same liberty with fees of other professional
men based on expert testimony.
"Often the Judges are not personally familiar with the current cost of
practicing law nor with the differences in such expense among the various
communities within a State.7
"Courts have in recent years recognized that economic conditions have
changed, particularly in personal injury cases in which verdicts many times
as great as those previously approved have been sustained.8 The Courts know
that most of these cases are handled by the attorneys on a contingent fee basis
and that the percentage has not changed. Therefore, in effect, they have
approved much higher attorney's fees in personal injury cases by reason of
the decreased purchasing power of the dollar. There is no reason why the
same factor should not be recognized in divorce cases.
"In those divorce cases where attorney's fees are in issue the attorney
must see that the record shows the extent of the services performed by him.
This will not appear in the ordinary case from the Court file. It must be
shown by reference to the file of the attorney handling the matter, or by
evidence or by affidavit. The record also should include expert testimony of
witnesses who are able to evaluate the service in terms of modern economic
conditions, taking into account the cost of practicing law in the particular
community. Such expert testimony based on a record showing the time con-
sumed by the attorney and the results accomplished should be given great
weight by the courts.9
"Contested divorce cases often involve a risk to the person and reputation
of the attorney. There is probably no contest as bitter as that between an
estranged husband and wife who will agree on nothing. Often either party
to such a contest will do anything to hurt the other party's attorney. Only
7. Without making any odious comparisons it may be said that due to higher rents,
higher salaries for secretarial help, higher telephone bills and other matters of that sort,
the overhead of a properly run first-class law office is five times or more as high in some
of the larger cities than it is in some of the smaller towns. Therefore, expert testimony
should be given by attorneys who are familiar with the conditions in a particular commu-
nity.8. From the opinion in the case of Margaret Ann Super Market v. Scholl, 159 Fla.
748, 34 So.2d 238 (1948) we quote the following language: "The degree of the negligence,
the extent of the injury and its equivalent in labor and commodities, are the main criteria
available to a jury to measure the amount of its verdict in a personal injury action. Jurors
are not permitted to divine their judgments from the ether, they are realists and are not
actuated by the philosophy of the cemetery. They get leads to their verdict from the
tangible and the commonplace and it speaks in terms of what the dollar will buy, so it
availeth little when cotton is 50 cents, corn $2.50, steak $1.00 and common labor $6.00,
to cite cases that were decided when cotton was 5 cents, corn was 50 cents, steak 25 cents
and common labor $1.00. The disparity is such that a verdict or judgment so predicated
looks capricious. It would be as reasonable to expect a carpenter to construct a house on
the basis of prices that prevailed in 1939. Respect for law will not emerge from judgments
so capricious." This was a personal injury case. The court sustained the judgment for an
amount which would have been reduced only a few years ago.
9. In cases where the wife is without money, the fee is necessarily contingent. All of
the discussions in the books as to attorney's fees recognize that in such cases (that is
where the fee is contingent) the attorney is entitled to a larger fee than in cases where he
takes no risk.
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recently an Atlanta husband shot his wife's divorce lawyer, and that happens
not infrequently. The element of risk is well known to attorneys who handle
these cases. Only such attorneys are in a position to evaluate the services in
terms of the risk involved.
"The Courts have sometimes greatly concerned themselves about the
amount of attorney's fees paid in divorce cases. Probably in some instances
the courts have been justified, but it should be recognized that the divorce
practice is a specialty, just as other fields of law. The expert in any field, be it
law or some other, is sought out and is justified by reason of his skill, in
charging higher fees than others who are less skillful or do not have so good a
reputation. The wife in a divorce suit is certainly entitled to good representation
of her own choice. In order to get it, her attorney should have the assurance
that he will be paid in accordance with the ability of the husband, taking into
account the skill and reputation of the attorney; otherwise, the wife may be
deprived of the type of representation to which she is entitled."
An attorney who has a volume practice can successfully handle divorce
cases in which Masters are appointed for a smaller fee than in cases where
the judge takes the testimony himself. The reasons are: First, that it is
rather difficult to get appointments in many Circuits; Second, that once the
taking of testimony is started before the court itself, it should proceed until
all of the testimony, at least for one side, has been taken; Third, those cir-
cumstances constitute more of an interference with the routine of the average
lawyer than would be the results of several shorter hearings before a Master,
which could be continued from time to time until all of the testimony had
been taken.
The amount of fees properly allowed depends largely upon the person-
ality of the client. I hope it will not start a controversy, but I must say that
where the client is a woman, the amount of work spent in fruitless conferences
and long explanations is generally much greater than in cases where the
client is a man. It is well known that women are more articulate than men
and therefore waste more time in discussing a problem, which is as important
to them as divorce, than do men. As a rule, men are inclined to keep their
mouths shut about their troubles, although there are some very pronounced
exceptions to the rule. In addition to the time spent in "holding his client's
hand," the lawyer must suffer considerable nerve strain in explaining the
same proposition over and over.
Some clients are more nervous than others. Some are unwilling to leave
any decisions to the attorney without long and elaborate explanations. These
matters do not appear in the cold record. There is another consideration that
may or may not appear in the record which entitles a lawyer to larger fees.
If the attorney wants it taken into consideration, he must make it appear
either by evidence, affidavit, or otherwise that a great deal of time and argu-
ment was spent in negotiations. When it does appear in the record, that the
attorneys for one side or the other were too combative, and perhaps lacking
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also in experience and ability or compelled by their client to do a large amount
of unnecessary work, the court may properly take that into account.
In considering unnecessary work-in the Randall case 10 Judge Buford
pointed out that there were 2200 pages of record but that 200 pages would
have been sufficient. It also appeared that the extra work and the superfluous
pages of the record were the fault of the attorneys for the husband. The clear
inference is that the Court took the unnecessary work into account in allow-
ing to the attorneys for the wife a fee of $7000 in the Circuit Court, and $1000
in the Supreme Court.
Since then Judge Terrell, because the attorneys for the wife had incurred
unnecessary expense and done unnecessary work in the taking of depositions
in another state, permitted the amount of the fee to stand, but required that
the lawyers responsible for the unnecessary bulk of the record should absorb
the expense of those depositions out of state depositions." In fixing fees the
court has indicated that the attorney for the wife can testify as to the services
rendered, but that he is not a proper witness as to the reasonable value of his
own service. 12
In the interest of the state itself and of justice, fees should not be reduced
below a reasonable amount. Low cost of litigation results in failure to attract
to the legal profession men of high ability, character and standing. Cheap
litigation has never resulted in the development of sound principles of law.
Divorce is never a pleasant subject, particularly where the parties have
their ow9 emotions deeply involved or where serious matters of property
and custody, support and maintenance of children are involved. There has
been too much of a tendency on the part of the attorneys and courts to try
to base reasonable fees upon the time consumed. Without question, services
which result in a quick conclusion of the case on proper terms are more
valuable to the client, than long drawn out negotiations or litigation which
produces no better result. It is certainly better for the client to avoid the
nerve strain, the worry, and the wear and tear upon the health of the client,
which will probably result from protracted litigation.
Following is a summary of the facts of the Chertkof Case '3 and
excerpts from the opinion of Judge Holt.
After preliminary papers were filed contesting jurisdiction the court
heard arguments on a motion to dismiss and referred the case to a master.
A transcript of 200 pages of testimony including master's recommendation
was returned to the court. On the second reference the plaintiff was successful
in defending the action. The divorce case consumed sixteen months of litiga-
tion and the plaintiff herein was awarded only $1000 temporary attorney's
10. Randall v. Randall, 158 Fla. 502, 29 So.2d 238 (1947).
11. Rubinow v. Rubinow, 40 So.2d 561 (1949).
12. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 101 Fla. 239, 134 So. 201 (1931).
13. Chertkof v. Loew, Civil No. 20902B, Eleventh Circuit, Fla., July 12, 1949.
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fees and the order dismissing the cause contained no provisions for additional
attorney's fees. It is disclosed by the testimony that the defendant herein has
an annual income of more than $200,000.
The plaintiff expended a great deal of time, and energy and that he
performed creditably is without question as he was successful in maintaining
his position.
The sole legal question is whether the attorney for the defendant wife
may bring a separate action against the husband for reasonable compensation
after the dismissal of the divorce suit.
Judge George Holt in his opinion in Chertkof v. Loew 14 held that: "The
husband is liable for services of the attorney rendered to his wife in a divorce
action brought by him against her.
"I cannot follow the contention that the courts frown upon a separate
suit against the husband for attorney's fees.... Generally the husband is not
liable in an independent action for attorney's fees for his wife.... It would be
a travesty and create a dangerous precedent if under the facts the plaintiff
be denied the relief which he seeks .... To deny him relief here would be to
say that he won his case but lost a fee.
"It is therefore, my conclusion, that legally, defendant is liable to plaintiff
for reasonable compensation for services rendered to the wife of the defendant
in a suit brought by the defendant against his wife for divorce ...
"As both judge and jury ,. . I find the services . . . were of such a
character and nature as to create liability for payment of a reasonable fee
therefor.
".. I further find that the defendant is a man of extreme wealth and is
fully able to pay .... Therefore, I find that a reasonable fee for the services
of the plaintiff in the circumstances described (based upon all the evidence
adduced) is the sum of $10,000.
"In so far as attorney's fees and compensation of officers of the courts
are concerned, there seems to me to be a concerted effort on the part of some
to reduce the lawyer to the servile condition of the slave ...
"It is my opinion that the lawyer needs protection so that he may pursue
his profession in such a manner that the best interest of the public will be
served, protected and defended. The lawyer should not be the object of un-
warranted criticism or attach . . [nor] be awarded unreasonable fees nor
charge excessively for his services.
"There is a reasonable middle ground between the two extremes. This
I propose to follow....
"The Plaintiff is entitled to the reasonable value of his services. He has
worked hard. He has been successful. He has not been paid."
14. Supra.
